Optimal lender of last resort policy in different financial systems

In a framework closely related to Diamond and Rajan (2001) we characterize different financial systems and analyze the welfare implications of different LOLR-policies in these financial systems. We show that in a bank-dominated financial system it is less likely that a LOLR-policy that follows the Bagehot rules is preferable. In financial systems with rather illiquid assets a discretionary individual liquidity assistance might be welfare improving, while in market-based financial systems, with rather liquid assets in the banks' balance sheets, emergency liquidity assistance provided freely to the market at a penalty rate is likely to be efficient. Thus, a "one size fits all"-approach that does not take the differences of financial systems into account is misguiding. JEL - Klassifikation: D52 , E44 , G21 , E52 , E5

The dark and the bright side of liquidity risks: evidence from open-end real estate funds in Germany

We use a unique and comprehensive data set on open-end real estate funds in Germany to study a liquidity crisis that hit this industry between 2005 and 2006. Since this industry is comparably unregulated our data set permits us to contrast competing explanations of liquidity crisis. We find that fundamental factors matter for the liquidity outflow in normal times. During the crisis, however, they do not play a role. During the panic only strategic complementarities drive withdrawals. Furthermore, we find that funds with a higher load fee suffer from substantially larger outflows in the crisis period, while a higher load fee reduces gross outflows in normal times. As institutional investors predominately invest in funds with a low load fee this is in line with recent theory arguing that complementarities are mitigated by the involvement of large institutional investors who can at least partially correct for the coordination failure resulting from complementarities. --Liquidity crisis,runs,strategic complementarities

Banks, markets, and efficiency

Following Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004) we use a model in which financial market access of households restrains the efficiency of the liquidity insurance that banks' deposit contracts provide to households that are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. But in contrast to these approaches we assume spacial monopolistic competition among banks. Since monopoly rents are assumed to bring about inefficiencies, improved financial market access that limits monopoly rents also entails a positive effect. But this beneficial effect is only relevant if competition among banks does not sufficiently restrain monopoly rents already. Thus our results suggest that in the bank-dominated financial system of Germany, in which banks intensely compete for households' deposits, improved financial market access might reduce welfare because it only reduces risk sharing. In contrast, in the banking system of the U.S., with less competition for households' deposits, a high level of households' financial market participation might be beneficial. --Financial Intermediaries,Risk Sharing,Banking Competition,Comparing Financial Systems

The marketability of bank assets and managerial rents: implications for financial stability

Ongoing financial innovation and greater information availability increase the tradability of bank assets and reduce banks' dependence on individual bank managers as private information in the lending process declines. In this paper we argue that this has two effects on banks, with opposing implications for banking stability. First, the hold-up problem between bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks' capital structure needs to be less concerned with disciplining the management. Deposits -the most effective disciplining device- can be reduced, increasing banks' resilience to adverse return shocks. However, limiting the hold-up problem also diminishes bank managers' rents, reducing their incentives to properly monitor and screen borrowers, with adverse implications for asset quality. Thus, even though the improved marketability of bank assets allows banks to adopt a safer capital structure, the default risk of banks does not necessarily decline. --Marketability,Incentives,Financial Innovations,Financial Stability

Financial intermediaries, markets, and growth

This paper contributes to the literature comparing the relative performance of financial intermediaries and markets by studying an environment in which a trade-off between risk sharing and growth arises endogenously. Financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against a liquidity shock. Households can also invest directly on a financial market, if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market. Moreover, intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they provide more risk-sharing. This creates a trade-off between risk-sharing and growth. We show the balance of intermediaries and market that maximizes welfare depend on parameter values.Financial intermediaries; Financial markets; Risk-sharing; Growth

Optimal lender of last resort policy in different financial systems

In a framework closely related to Diamond and Rajan (2001) we characterize different financial systems and analyze the welfare implications of different LOLR-policies in these financial systems. We show that in a bank-dominated financial system it is less likely that a LOLR-policy that follows the Bagehot rules is preferable. In financial systems with rather illiquid assets a discretionary individual liquidity assistance might be welfare improving, while in market-based financial systems, with rather liquid assets in the banks' balance sheets, emergency liquidity assistance provided freely to the market at a penalty rate is likely to be efficient. Thus, a "one size fits all"-approach that does not take the differences of financial systems into account is misguiding. --Financial Crises,Lender of Last Resort,Comparing Financial Systems

Banks, Markets, and Efficiency

Following Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004) we use a model in which financial market access of households restrains the efficiency of the liquidity insurance that banks' deposit contracts provide to households that are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. But in contrast to these approaches we assume spacial monopolistic competition among banks. Since monopoly rents are assumed to bring about inefficiencies, improved financial market access that limits monopoly rents also entails a positive effect. But this beneficial effect is only relevant if competition among banks does not sufficiently restrain monopoly rents already. Thus our results suggest that in the bank-dominated financial system of Germany, in which banks intensely compete for households' deposits, improved financial market access might reduce welfare because it only reduces risk sharing. In contrast, in the banking system of the U.S., with less competition for households' deposits, a high level of households' financial market participation might be beneficial.Financial Intermediaries, Risk Sharing, Banking Competition, Comparing Financial Systems

Money market derivatives and the allocation of liquidity risk in the banking sector

Money markets have two functions, the allocation of liquidity and the processing of information. We develop a model that allows us to evaluate the efficiency of different money market derivatives regarding these two objectives. We assume that due to its size, a large bank receives a more precise signal about the overall liquidity development in the banking sector. In an upcoming liquidity shortage this large bank can exploit its informational advantage in the spot money market by rationing liquidity. Using forward contracts, the large bank can credibly commit not to squeeze small banks in the event of a liquidity shortage. But forward contracts do not provide incentives for the large bank to pass on its information to other banks. In contrast, lines of credit between the large and the small banks ensure that the large bank provides its information to other banks. --Liquidity,money market derivatives,lines of credit,forward contracts,options

Financial Intermediation, markets, and growth

This paper contributes to the literature comparing the relative performance of financial intermediaries and markets by studying an environment in which a trade-off between risk sharing and growth arises endogenously. Financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against a liquidity shock. Households can also invest directly on a financial market if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market. Moreover, intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they provide more risk-sharing. This creates a trade-off between risk-sharing and growth. We show the mix of intermediaries and market that maximizes welfare depend on parameter valuesFinancial intermediation, financial markets, risk-shring, growth

The Eurosystem money market auctions: a banking perspective

This paper analyzes the individual bidding behavior of German banks in the money market auctions conducted by the ECB from the beginning of the third quarter of 2000 to the end of the first quarter of 2001. Our approach takes a variety of characteristics of the individual banks into account. In particular, we consider variables that capture the different use of liquidity and the different attitude towards liquidity risk of the individual banks. It turns out that these characteristics are reflected in the banks’ respective bidding behavior to a large extent. Thus our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the way liquidity risk is managed in the banking sector.Banks and banking, Central ; Bank liquidity ; European Central Bank ; Interbank market